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hen most people think of cybersecurity and cyberattacks, their 
attention probably turns to privacy violations and theft of 
personal information—invasions of personal security. This is natural 
given well-publicized incidents in recent years, including the data 
breaches of personal information from customers of national retail 
businesses such as Target and Home Depot, as well as large banks.1 
These are harmful incidents, to be sure, and incidents like these affect 
millions of people. However, there are more serious threats with the 
potential to cause damage beyond the individual level. Without a 
doubt, invasions of privacy, including breaches of personal health and 
financial records, are serious matters. Nonetheless, there are dangers 
with the potential to cause great harm to national and societal 
security. Cyberattacks involve more than theft of information; they 
can damage or destroy property, which in turn can lead to loss of life 
(perhaps even large-scale loss of life). This is especially true for 
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1 See Kristin N. Johnson, Managing Cyber Risks, 50 GA. L. REV. 547, 550–52 (2016). 
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attacks on systems that are designated as critical infrastructure.2 This 
Article addresses the issue of cybersecurity and threats to critical 
infrastructure from individuals, nation-states, and/or groups of 
individuals (working on behalf of or independently of nation-states). 
To understand the threat, several recent events deserve attention. 
On December 23, 2015, a control center in western Ukraine lost 
control of the electrical power grid for that region.3 A cyberattack 
shut down the substations despite the efforts of the operators to regain 
control of their computer network.4 One operator’s computer logged 
him out of the system and prevented him from regaining entry.5 The 
computer then proceeded to shut down about thirty substations.6 The 
attackers struck two other power distribution centers at the same time 
and disabled backup power supplies.7 More than 230,000 people lost 
power in the dead of winter. This was the first confirmed cyberattack 
that shut down a power grid.8 According to the investigation 
following the attack, the attack was planned over many months.9 The 
hackers conducted reconnaissance to study the networks and access 
operator credentials, and then they launched a synchronized assault.10 
One of the investigators (a former cyberwarfare operations officer in 
the U.S. Air Force) noted the sophistication in logistics, planning, and 
operation.11 Although the identity of the cyberattackers is uncertain, 
Ukraine blamed Russia for the attack.12 What should cause concern 
 
2 The language used to describe these threats is not particularly helpful in encouraging 
an examination of the distinction between personal threats versus national/societal threats. 
The terms “cybersecurity” and “cyberattacks” are used loosely and describe a wide range 
of activity (from annoying to criminal, committed by actors ranging from lone hackers to 
nation-states). “Cybersecurity is also sometimes conflated inappropriately in public 
discussion with other concepts such as privacy, information sharing, intelligence 
gathering, and surveillance.” ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43831, 
CYBERSECURITY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: IN BRIEF 1 (2016). 
3 Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid, 
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unpre 
cedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. Russia is also suspected of conducting a cyberattack on Estonia’s critical 
infrastructure in 2007. The attack shut down Estonia’s banking system, telephone 
connections, and television networks. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-
Security, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2013). 
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for Americans is that the Ukrainian cybercontrol systems were 
thought to be stronger and more secure than the systems in place for 
many power grids in the United States. 
It appears that the attack on the Ukrainian power grid was not 
intended to result in permanent damage. It may have been conducted 
to send a message. If that was the case, Ukraine was fortunate. 
A cyber-attack on the power grid would be truly catastrophic. The 
industrial control, or SCADA, systems used by power plants and 
other utilities are increasingly connected to the Internet. Hackers 
could exploit this connectivity to disrupt power generation and 
leave tens of millions of people in the dark for months. They could 
even destroy key system components like turbines.13 
The attack on the Ukrainian power grid may have been exceptional 
only insofar as its effectiveness. There are reports that electric utilities 
are probed thousands of times each month by hackers and that nation-
states designed plans for attacking the power grids of other 
countries.14 
In 2016, another group of hackers stole $81 million from the 
Bangladesh Central Bank.15 There is speculation that the hackers 
breached the Bank’s network, which was made possible by a lack of 
firewall protection.16 The money was transferred into the accounts of 
casinos in the Philippines; from there, the money disappeared.17 A 
central bank is a nation-state’s bank. This was a theft from the 
 
13 Sales, supra note 12, at 1514. A report from the Congressional Research Service 
states, 
attacks on industrial control systems can result in the destruction or disruption of 
the equipment they control, such as generators, pumps, and centrifuges. Most 
cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some components 
of critical infrastructure (CI)—most of which is held by the private sector—could 
have significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and 
safety of individual citizens. 
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
14 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the 
Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995, 2005–06 (2016) 
[hereinafter Shackelford et al., Sustainable Cybersecurity]. The New York Times recently 
reported that North Korea may acquire the capability to launch a cyberattack on the United 
States’ power grid. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Trump Inherits a Secret 
Cyberwar on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2017, at A1. 
15 See Kim Zetter, That Insane, $81M Bangladesh Bank Heist? Here’s What We Know, 
WIRED (May 17, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangla 
desh-bank-heist-heres-know/. 
16 Id. 
17 See Michael Corkery, An $81 Million Sneak Attack on the World Banking System, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2016, at A1. 
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government of Bangladesh. Many were surprised that a nation-state 
could be the victim of this kind of cybertheft. 
A more recent, widespread attack on critical infrastructure occurred 
in May 2017. Using malicious software known as WannaCry, hackers 
engaged in a cyberattack that affected Internet-linked networks in 
dozens of countries.18 Among its effects, the attack shut down access 
to patient files in Britain’s National Health Service and many of its 
hospitals.19 The attacks also affected the Russian Interior Ministry, 
the German rail system, European telecommunications companies, 
and a Chinese airline.20 WannaCry is a type of ransomware—a 
malicious program that encrypts files, folders, and drives on a 
computer.21 Once the ransomware is in place, the hackers demand 
payment of a ransom for a key to unlock the encryption.22 
Ransomware attacks are common, but the WannaCry attack attracted 
wide attention because the victims were located all over the world and 
were high profile, sophisticated institutions at the heart of critical 
infrastructure systems.23 
Just a month later, in June 2017, another ransomware attack, which 
was described as an improved and more dangerous version of 
WannaCry, affected critical infrastructure systems around the 
world.24 The attack caused the shutdown of bank ATMs in Ukraine, 
the disruption of payment mechanisms on the Kiev metro, and the 
shutdown of all computers at a Ukrainian electrical power company.25 
The attack then spread beyond Ukraine. The attack caused a Russian 
bank to close all its offices, forced hospitals in Pennsylvania to cancel 
operations, and demanded ransom from a chocolate factory in 
Australia.26 As if further demonstration was necessary to prove the 
 
18 See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Hackers Use Tool Taken From N.S.A. in 
Global Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2017, at A1; see generally Electronic Bandits, 
ECONOMIST, May 2017, at 70. 
19 Russell Goldman, Ransomware: How Hackers Hold Data Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 2017, at A9. 
20 Id. 
21 See Electronic Bandits, supra note 18. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Nicole Perlroth et al., Cyberattack Hits Ukraine, Then Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 2017, at A1. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. The cyberattack also affected the operations of Maersk, one of the largest ocean 
freight transport companies. Maersk estimated that it lost as much as $300 million as a 
result of the loss of business caused by the attack. See Jordan Novet, Shipping Company 
Maersk Says June Cyberattack Could Cost It up to $300 Million, CNBC (Aug. 16, 2017, 
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prevalence and potential dangers posed by cyberattacks, July 2017 
brought several media reports of attacks on electric utilities in the 
United States.27 The most notable instance was an attempt to breach 
the network at a nuclear power plant in Kansas.28 According to 
government agencies, public safety was never in danger. Nonetheless, 
these reports confirm the constant threat to critical infrastructure 
systems. 
Nation-states themselves conduct cyberattacks. The United States 
has reportedly conducted cyberattacks on North Korea to damage its 
nuclear missile program.29 In the past few years, a large number of 
North Korea’s rockets have unexpectedly exploded, veered off 
course, or disintegrated in midair and plunged into the sea.30 Some 
observers believe that such failures are the result of American 
cyberattacks, but this has not been confirmed, and some doubt 
America has the capability to cause such failures.31 A more widely 
known cyberattack occurred with the use of the Stuxnet virus, which 
damaged Iran’s nuclear program. In June 2009, someone introduced a 
destructive digital worm into the computer network controlling Iran’s 
nuclear enrichment program.32 Stuxnet was the “world’s first real 
cyberweapon.”33 Unlike other worms or viruses, Stuxnet did not 
simply hijack targeted computers or steal information; it physically 
destroyed equipment controlled by the computers.34 Stuxnet 
physically destroyed hundreds of centrifuges, which are necessary 
pieces of equipment to make nuclear weapons.35 It is widely assumed 
 
2:04 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/16/maersk-says-notpetya-cyberattack-could      
-cost-300-million.html. 
27 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Are Targeting Nuclear Plants, U.S. Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2017, at B5 (While the reports were published in July 2017, it is unclear 
when the attacks occurred.). 
28 See id. 
29 See Sanger & Broad, supra note 14. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing 
Malware in History, WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/07 
/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/. 
33 Id. 
34 See Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital 
Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to 
-zero-day-stuxnet/. 
35 See id. “Centrifuges are large cylindrical tubes—connected by pipes in a 
configuration known as a ‘cascade’—that spin at supersonic speed to separate isotopes in 
uranium gas for use in nuclear power plants and weapons.” Id. The centrifuges were 
governed by a control system supplied by Siemans, a large German industrial/technology 
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that Stuxnet was developed by the United States and Israel, although 
that has never been publicly confirmed.36 
The shutdown of a power grid, the theft of millions of dollars from 
a central bank, and the attacks on nuclear weapons programs share a 
common thread—they all were cyberattacks on a country’s critical 
infrastructure. The threats are real, not hypothetical, and exist today, 
not somewhere in the future. Cyberattackers possess the capability to 
cause oil spills (by attacking pipelines or refineries), power generator 
explosions, train derailments, airplane crashes, and missile 
detonations.37 The vital roles that critical infrastructure systems play 
in the necessary functions of a society means that any disruption or 
damage could cripple it. The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 
2001 defines critical infrastructure (CI) as the “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”38 The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopts this definition as 
well.39 DHS identified sixteen critical infrastructure sectors. They are 
the (1) chemical sector; (2) commercial facilities sector; (3) 
communications sector; (4) critical manufacturing sector; (5) dams 
sector; (6) defense industrial base sector; (7) emergency services 
sector; (8) energy sector; (9) financial services sector; (10) food and 
agriculture sector; (11) government facilities sector; (12) healthcare 
and public health sector; (13) information technology sector; (14) 
nuclear reactors, materials and waste sector; (15) transportation 
systems sector; and (16) water and wastewater systems sector.40 
Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure have the potential to (1) 
cripple or destroy an individual business; (2) cripple or destroy the 
ability to provide basic public services on a local, regional, or national 
 
firm (the controller is called the Process Control System 7). See William J. Broad et al., 
Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. 
Stuxnet targeted and took over control of the Siemans controllers, which in turn caused the 
centrifuges to spin at a rate that caused them to physically destruct. Id. 
36 See Broad et al., supra note 35. 
37 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT 
TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70 (2010). 
38 Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012). 
39 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., What is Critical Infrastructure?, HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure (last updated July 12, 2017). 
40 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Critical Infrastructure Sectors, HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors (last updated July 11, 
2017). 
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scale; and (3) cause loss of property or even loss of life, perhaps on a 
catastrophic scale. Cyberattacks on CI have occurred and continue to 
occur. CI is particularly at risk because most of it is owned by the 
private sector, with private owners utilizing different security 
practices.41 
Electric power grids, communications networks, air traffic control 
systems, maritime navigation systems, and bank payment systems are 
just a few examples of CI owned by the private sector. Everyone 
depends on these systems for safety, health, and welfare. Typically, 
one would expect the government to be in charge of protecting 
systemically crucial systems. For example, people do not expect the 
private sector to provide an army or a navy. But most CI systems are 
provided by private entities that are responsible for protecting their 
own systems. While some cyberattacks are personally intrusive and 
violate privacy, this Article addresses the kinds of cyberattacks that 
can cause catastrophic loss of life and property, and it discusses the 
consequences of the fact that most CI systems are privately owned. 
Most cyberattacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on 
some components of critical infrastructure (CI)–most of which is 
held by the private sector–could have significant effects on national 
security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety of individual 
citizens. Thus, a rare successful attack with high impact can pose a 
larger risk than a common successful attack with low impact.42 
The aviation industry provides an illustration of systemic 
vulnerabilities that have analogues in a wide range of CI systems. 
Aviation relies on interconnected networks of electronic systems. An 
airport relies on such networks to operate its security, power, fueling, 
and aircraft maintenance systems.43 The air traffic control system 
relies on Internet Protocol (IP) networking to communicate.44 The 
operation of an aircraft depends upon systems connected to multiple 
networks.45 A passenger jet is vulnerable to interference with its flight 
 
41 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, 
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 
753, 767 (2016). 
42 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3. 
43 See Andrew V. Schmidt, Note, Cyberterrorism: Combating the Aviation Industry’s 
Vulnerability to Cyberattack, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 169, 187 (2016). 
44 Id. at 188–89. 
45 See generally INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 259 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. The predecessor of the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 was published in 2013. It was called the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare, and was the “product of a three-year project by twenty 
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control systems and its onboard navigation and communications 
systems.46 A Boeing 777 has over three million parts produced by 
500 suppliers, and many of these parts are linked through electronic 
networks connected to the Internet.47 Anything connected to the 
Internet is exposed to cyberattack.48 Points of connection pose 
 
renowned international law scholars and practitioners” and “identifies the international law 
applicable to cyber warfare and sets out ninety-five ‘black-letter rules’ governing such 
conflicts.” INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, at opening page (Michael Schmitt ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 supersedes the Tallinn Manual. 
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra, at 1–2. 
46 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 45, at 259. 
47 Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in 
the Aerospace Sector, 10 FIU L. REV. 635, 641 (2015) [hereinafter Shackelford & Russell, 
Above the Cloud]. 
48 See Peter Haynes & Thomas A. Campbell, Hacking the Internet of Everything, SCI. 
AM. (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hacking-internet-of-every 
thing/. Generally, devices are connected to the Internet through servers, including web 
servers. 
Internet servers make the Internet possible. All of the machines on the Internet 
are either servers or clients. The machines that provide services to other 
machines are servers. And the machines that are used to connect to those services 
are clients. There are Web servers, e-mail servers, FTP servers and so on serving 
the needs of Internet users all over the world. 
Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer.how 
stuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-infrastructure9.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
The web server is comprised of the hardware, operating system, web server software, 
TCP/IP protocols and site content, which together enable delivery of information from the 
Internet to the browser. Definition of: Web Server, PCMAG., http://www.pcmag.com 
/encyclopedia/term/54342/web-server (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Attacks on web servers 
are a common form of cyberattack. Cyber Security, BERKELEY LAB, https://commons 
.lbl.gov/display/cpp/Web+Server+Requirement%3A+OS+and+Application (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2017). The Federal Communications Commission issued a warning to small 
businesses about attacks on web servers: “Web servers, which host the data and other 
content available to your customers on the Internet, are often the most targeted and 
attacked components of a company’s network.” FCC, CYBER SECURITY PLANNING GUIDE 
WS-1 (2012), https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyberplanner.pdf. 
The following are examples of specific security threats to web servers: 
• Cyber criminals may exploit software bugs in the web server, underlying 
operating system, or active content to gain unauthorized access to the web 
server. Examples of unauthorized access include gaining access to files or 
folders that were not meant to be publicly accessible and being able to 
execute commands and/or install malicious software on the web server. 
• Denial-of-service attacks may be directed at the web server or its 
supporting network infrastructure to prevent or hinder your website users 
from making use of its services. This can include preventing the user from 
accessing email, websites, online accounts or other services. The most 
common attack occurs when the attacker floods a network with 
information, so that it can’t process the user’s request. 
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vulnerabilities and require cybersecurity defenses. The potential exists 
to endanger a single aircraft or even the air traffic control system 
through a cyberbreach.49 
A basic challenge in cybersecurity is the fact that approximately 
eighty-five percent of America’s CI is owned by the private sector.50 
The CI systems are owned and operated by thousands of businesses, 
which in turn may have thousands more private entities who either 
supply, service, or access the CI systems. The national cybersecurity 
framework relies on private actors to invest in a sufficient amount of 
cybersecurity measures to avoid catastrophic damage to CI. However, 
few private entities are required by law to implement any particular 
level of cybersecurity.51 Thus, it is not surprising that many experts 
 
• Sensitive information on the web server may be read or modified without 
authorization. 
• Sensitive information on backend databases that are used to support 
interactive elements of a web application may be compromised through 
the injection of unauthorized software commands. Examples include 
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection, Lightweight Directory 
Access Protocol (LDAP) injection and cross-site scripting (XSS). 
• Sensitive unencrypted information transmitted between the web server 
and the browser may be intercepted. 
• Information on the web server may be changed for malicious purposes. 
Website defacement is a commonly reported example of this threat. 
• Cyber criminals may gain unauthorized access to resources elsewhere in 
the organization’s network via a successful attack on the web server. 
• Cyber criminals may also attack external entities after compromising a 
web server. These attacks can be launched directly (e.g., from the 
compromised server against an external server) or indirectly (e.g., placing 
malicious content on the compromised web server that attempts to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the web browsers of users visiting the site). 
• The server may be used as a distribution point for attack tools, 
pornography or illegally copied software. 
Id. 
49 With such dangers in mind, the German military launched a new cybersecurity 
initiative in 2017 to protect its aviation system. Andrea Shalal, German Military Aviation 
Command Launches Cyber Threat Initiative, REUTERS (July 12, 2017, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-military-cyber-aviation-idUSKBN19X2J6 
?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social. The initiative was motivated, in part, by a 
demonstration of a hacker’s ability to take control of an aircraft, and the industry’s 
adoption of communication protocols similar to those used on the internet to connect 
cockpits, cabins and ground controls, which expose air traffic to vulnerabilities. Id. 
50 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1506. 
51 Id. One important exception applies to private firms that contract with the 
Department of Defense (DOD) in certain situations. For example, the DOD published an 
interim final rule, which requires contractors to comply with certain cybersecurity 
requirements specified by the National Institute for Standards and Technology. Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and 
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describe the state of cybersecurity defenses for CI as “inadequate.”52 
The government does not impose security requirements, leaving it to 
the private-sector entities to set their own practices and policies for 
protecting their computer systems.53 
At this point, a summary of statutory definitions and loose, 
working definitions is necessary. This Article uses the term 
“cyberspace” to mean “the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers in critical industries.”54 “Cybersecurity” is 
used generally to mean (1) “[a] set of activities and other measures 
intended to protect—from attack, disruption, or other threats—
computers, computer networks, related hardware and devices 
software and the information they contain and communicate, 
including software and data, as well as other elements of cyberspace”; 
(2) “[t]he state or quality of being protected from threats”; and (3) 
“[t]he broad field of endeavor aimed at implementing and improving 
those activities and quality.”55 This Article also adopts the definition 
of “cyberattack” used by the United States military: 
A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and 
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber 
systems, assets, or functions. The intended effects of cyber attack 
are not necessarily limited to the targeted computer systems or data 
themselves—for instance, attacks on computer systems which are 
intended to degrade or destroy infrastructure . . . . A cyber attack 
may use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral 
devices, electronic transmitters, embedded code, or human 
 
Contracting for Cloud Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,739 (effective Aug. 26, 2015) (interim 
rule). The National Institute for Standards and Technology and its role in cybersecurity is 
discussed in Part II. This particular requirement has the goal of safeguarding access to the 
Cloud by contractors. Id. 
52 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1506. 
53 Id. 
54 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-54 
3 (Jan. 8, 2008), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-54.pdf (so defining). 
55 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 1. There is no agreed upon meaning of the term; it serves 
more as a loose reference. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 291 (2014) (“there is surprising disagreement” as to precise 
definitions). A similar working definition of cybersecurity is “the policy field concerned 
with managing cyber threats, including unauthorized access, disruption, and modification 
of electronically stored information, software, hardware, services, and networks.” Scott J. 
Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the 
Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National 
and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 311–12 (2015) 
[hereinafter Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity]. 
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operators. The activation or effect of a cyber attack may be widely 
separated temporally and geographically from delivery.56 
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA) also 
sets forth important definitions.57 It defines “cybersecurity purpose” 
to mean “the purpose of protecting an information system or 
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an 
information system from a cybersecurity threat or security 
vulnerability.”58 It also defines “cybersecurity threat” to mean 
an action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, on or through an information system that may 
result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, 
availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or 
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an 
information system.59 
Part I of this Article explains that cybersecurity protection of CI is 
a “public good.” This is important because a market economy faces 
inherent barriers to providing public goods. In general, public goods 
are things or situations that provide a widespread benefit available to 
all. The economic problem they pose, however, is that any person 
providing a public good is unable to capture the full economic benefit 
or profit of providing the good. This means there is little economic or 
profit incentive to do so, which results in the less than optimal supply 
of such goods. This conundrum describes the problem in protecting 
CI. Part II presents an overview of the state of America’s 
cybersecurity laws and the government’s efforts to promote strong 
cybersecurity for CI. The government’s approach is to encourage 
voluntary responses by the private sector to improve cybersecurity (in 
contrast to imposing mandates). Part III explains why the government 
has chosen a voluntary approach in this area and discusses reasons 
why such an approach is rational and/or desirable. However, there are 
significant problems with this approach. Thus, Part IV discusses the 
disadvantages of relying on voluntary efforts by the private sector to 
provide a public good. A major problem is the significant market 
disincentive to any private entity that is in a position to supply a 
public good. The market is unable to provide a profit incentive to a 
 
56 Memorandum from James E. Cartwright, Gen., United States Marine Corps and Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations to 
Chiefs of the Military Services (2010), http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/2010   
-11-joint%20Terminology%20for%20Cyberspace%20Operations.pdf. 
57 6 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) (effective Dec. 18, 2015). 
58 Id. § 1501(4). 
59 Id. § 1501(5)(A). 
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private supplier of a public good because the supplier generally 
cannot capture the profit/benefit of public goods they supply. This 
results in market failure—the inability of a free market to supply the 
optimal amount of a public good.60 Market failures for public goods 
have traditionally been addressed by government-based solutions.61 
In line with this approach, Part V presents a modest proposal to 
improve cybersecurity based on expanding already established 
subsidies to encourage and facilitate additional spending on 
cybersecurity by private entities. A few summary observations are set 
forth in the Conclusion. 
I 
CYBERSECURITY AND PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
Protection of CI from cyberattacks is a matter of national security. 
The Department of Homeland Security makes that clear in its 
definition of CI. President Obama described cybersecurity as “one of 
the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as 
a nation.”62 This challenge is due to the increasingly important role of 
the Internet for personal, business, and government use. The Internet 
is inseparable from numerous CI systems and is in itself CI.63 
 
60 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 929–30 (2005) (discussing market failure for 
infrastructure). 
61 Id. at 925. 
62 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Cybersecurity and 
Consumer Protection Summit (Feb. 13, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the   
-press-office/2015/02/13/remarks-president-cybersecurity-and-consumer-protection-sum 
mit. 
63 See Frischmann, supra note 60, at 920. 
 The Internet meets all three demand-side criteria for infrastructure. The 
Internet infrastructure is a partially (non)rival good; it is consumed both 
nonrivalrously and rivalrously, depending upon available capacity. The benefits 
of the Internet are realized at the ends. Like a road system, a lake, and basic 
research, the Internet is socially valuable primarily because of the productive 
activity it facilitates downstream. That is, end-users hooked up to the Internet 
infrastructure generate value and realize benefits through the applications run on 
their computers and through the consumption of content delivered over the 
Internet . . . . The Internet currently is a mixed commercial, public, and social 
infrastructure. 
Id. at 1006. 
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National security (which includes cybersecurity protection of CI) is 
a public good.64 A public good is a thing or condition that benefits all 
members of a society.65 Infrastructure, in all forms, generates public 
goods.66 To use the scholarly jargon, a public good is something that 
is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.67A good is nonexcludable if 
 
64 Public Goods - The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series, Episode 17, FED. RES. 
BANK ST. LOUIS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-podcast-series 
/episode-17-public-goods (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Public Goods Podcast]. 
65 See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Public and Private Goods, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG, (June 19, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2016 
/06/legal-theory-lexicon-public-and-private-goods.html (explaining that “[t]he phrase 
‘public good’ or ‘public goods shall be used . . . to refer to the economists’ idea of goods 
(in the broad sense that includes both ‘goods’ and ‘services’)”). 
66 See Frischmann, supra note 60, at 931–32. 
67 See Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64; see also Solum, supra note 65. Solum 
provides: 
 There are two criteria by which public goods are distinguished from private 
goods. A good is public only if it is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. A 
good is private only if it is both rivalrous and excludable. (We will deal with the 
mixed cases in just a bit.) 
 “Rivalrousness” is a property of the consumption of a good. Consumption of a 
good is rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the opportunity 
of other individuals, Y, Z, etc., to consume the good. Some goods are rivalrous 
because they are “used up.” If I drink a glass of Heitz Martha’s Vineyard, then 
you cannot drink that same glass of wine. If I set off a firecracker, you cannot set 
off the same firecracker. Other goods are rivalrous because of crowding effects. 
If I am using the free internet terminal at the student lounge, then you cannot use 
the same time slice of the terminal—because only one person can sit in front of 
the screen at the same time. 
 “Excludability” is also a property of consumption of a good. It is helpful to 
distinguish two forms of excludability: (1) excludability through self help, and 
(2) excludability through law. If I want to exclude you from my land, I can build 
a fence—the exclusion results from self help. But if I want to exclude you from 
copying a novel that I’ve written and I want to make the novel generally 
available for sale, self help will not work. (It would be ridiculously expensive to 
hire a guard to monitor each copy or every photocopy machine.) Government, 
however, can make unauthorized copying a criminal offense or actionable civil 
wrong, thereby creating exclusion through law. 
Solum, supra note 65. 
 Nonrivalry is a key economic concept that one must appreciate when 
analyzing social welfare from a utilitarian perspective. Synonymous with 
indivisibility of benefits, nonrivalry describes the situation “when a unit of [a] 
good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the slightest, 
from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit.” 
For economists, “consumption” simply refers to the realization of benefits by 
virtue of one’s access to the good. 
Frischmann, supra note 60, at 942 (quoting RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE 
THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (1996)). 
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one is unable to prevent others from consuming or using it.68 A good 
is nonrivalrous if one person’s consumption does not negatively affect 
anyone else’s consumption of the good.69 The benefit accrues to each 
individual whether he pays for it or not and is not diminished by 
anyone else’s enjoyment or consumption. The phrase “public good” is 
not limited to things that physically exist; it includes services and 
intangible benefits. To illustrate, the eradication of a disease is a 
nonexcludable good because one is unable to prevent others from 
benefiting from it. Nice weather is a nonrivalrous good because one 
person’s enjoyment of the weather does not mean there is less nice 
weather for others. By contrast, a pie is not a public good. One is able 
to prevent others from eating the pie, so it does not possess the 
characteristic of nonexcludability. The pie also does not qualify as a 
nonrivalrous good because if one person eats the pie, no one else can. 
An often-used example of a public good is national security.70 
National security is nonexcludable because if another country tried to 
invade California, the military would act to protect it regardless of 
whether individual Californian citizens paid their taxes.71 It is 
nonrivalrous because one person’s use of the public good does not 
 
68 See Solum, supra note 65. 
69 Id. 
70 Professor Solum explains, 
• Public goods have two characteristics—nonrivalrousness and nonexcludability. 
For example, consumption of national defense is nonrivalrous (my being 
protected by the U.S. armed forces doesn’t diminish your protection). National 
defense is a nonexcludable good: the Army cannot say to Mexico, “Solum hasn’t 
paid his national defense bill, Go ahead and attack him.” 
• Private goods are rivalrous and excludable. If I own a laptop computer, my use 
of it diminishes your ability to use it; therefore, my consumption of the laptop 
rivals yours. Moreover, I can exclude you from the use of my laptop (by locking 
it up when I am not using it). 
Id. 
 National security is an example of a public good. We all benefit from this 
government service with hardly a second thought. We pay our taxes to the 
government, and the government uses part of those funds to defend the country 
from foreign and domestic threats. National security is nonexcludable because 
there is no way of withholding protection from those who don’t pay taxes. If a 
missile were heading for the country, the military would shoot it down to save 
everyone in its path, regardless of who did and didn’t pay their taxes. National 
defense is nonrival because one person’s use of it does not hinder anyone else’s 
consumption. For example, as the population grows, more people benefit from 
national security, but the level of protection for those already benefiting remains 
the same. 
Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64. 
71 See Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64. 
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hinder anyone else’s consumption; one person’s enjoyment of 
national security does not mean there is less protection for others.72 
National security is provided by the federal government at taxpayer 
expense. Governments usually supply public goods.73 A general 
principle of economics (and related legal theory) is that markets 
should provide private goods and government should provide public 
goods.74 The reason for this is explained by economic theory. 
Economic theory states that no rational person will voluntarily pay 
for a public good as long as someone else does. An individual enjoys 
clean air as long as someone else pays for the cost of clean air. An 
American within the United States is protected by America’s 
antimissile defenses whether she pays taxes or not. This is the classic 
“free rider” problem.75 Another aspect of this problem is that the free 
rider enjoys as much of the public good as someone who pays for it. 
Because no rational individual will voluntarily pay for a public good, 
societies turn to government to pay for public goods through taxes. 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See Solum, supra note 65. 
75 Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64. 
Free riders are the consumers who don’t pay in order to consume the public 
good. Since public goods are free, most consumers become free riders because 
they have no incentive to pay the supplier. After all, consumers have a budget, so 
they won’t likely pay for a good if they can get it for free. While there may be 
people who recognize the importance of a public good and have enough money 
to donate voluntarily, they form the exception to the rule. In general, people will 
not pay willingly for a public good. 
If a private business supplied a public good, most people would consume the 
product for free. Since it is nonexcludable and nonrival, consumers can already 
get the full benefits without paying anything. They won’t likely donate much, if 
any, of their hard-earned cash. Hence, the company won’t make much money. 
That’s why private firms won’t produce public goods; there’s no reward. Firms 
instead spend their time and resources producing private goods because people 
do have to pay for those, allowing the firm to sell them for a profit. 
Id. 
 Some products, like national defense or police services, will not be produced in 
private markets because of what is called the “free-rider” problem. These 
products, called “public goods,” have the unique character that consumption of 
them by one consumer does not diminish the possibility of consumption by 
another consumer. As a result, public goods must be purchased by the 
government if they are to be purchased at all. Otherwise, every consumer will 
attempt to become a free rider by waiting for someone else to purchase the 
product so that it can be used for free. Government regulation concerning the 
method and collection of taxes ensures that each citizen pays a share of the cost 
of governmental purchases of public goods. 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 15 (6th ed. 2014). 
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In addition to the free rider problem, economic externalities also 
present an obstacle to the private sector providing goods. An 
economic externality is a cost generated by an activity that is not 
borne by the person or firm who engages in the activity.76 An 
economic externality may also be described as “an effect on the 
market the source of which is external to the market.”77 It is “the 
imposition of a cost or benefit on a nonconsenting third party” by the 
party engaging in the economic activity.78 
Externalities can be either positive or negative. “Positive 
externalities occur whenever an activity generates benefits that the 
actor is unable to internalize,” such as through prices; “[n]egative 
externalities occur when one’s activity imposes costs on others” that 
likewise are not transmitted through prices. Economic theory 
predicts that the market will oversupply negative externalities 
relative to socially optimal levels “because the producer will 
internalize all benefits of the activity but not all the costs.” It also 
predicts that the market will undersupply positive externalities 
because third parties will free ride. Externalities thus represent a 
form of market failure. The standard government response to a 
negative externality is to discourage the responsible conduct (e.g., 
with taxation or regulation); the standard response to a positive 
externality is to encourage the responsible conduct (e.g., with a 
subsidy).79 
To illustrate, smoke from a factory chimney that blankets the 
surrounding area is a negative externality because it is a harm 
suffered by nonconsenting third parties caused by the economic 
activity of the factory.80 Absent government intervention, the factory 
owner does not bear the cost imposed on others. In contrast, a world-
famous museum that attracts visitors from around the world generates 
positive externalities. However, the museum is unable to capture the 
benefit that surrounding businesses enjoy for free (such as increased 
 
76 See Solum, supra note 65. 
77 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1519 (quoting Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, 
Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 553, 563 (1999)). 
78 Id. at 1520. 
79 Id. 
80 An administrative law treatise states: 
If a manufacturing process, for example, produces toxic vapors that make 
persons ill, the manufacturer should pay for the medical expenses of those 
persons and include them as part of the price for which the product is sold. If the 
manufacturer does not pay those costs, the product will be overproduced. There 
will be more demand for the product than if it were sold at a higher price that 
reflected the damages its production caused. 
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 15. 
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tourism and higher real estate prices) due to their proximity to the 
museum (absent government intervention).81 
The protection of CI from cyberattacks presents a set of difficult 
problems. Protection of CI is a matter of national security and 
defense. It is a public good that benefits all. However, the government 
relies on private owners of CI to provide the public good even though 
there is little economic incentive to do so. Of course, self-protection 
provides an incentive to invest in cybersecurity, but the problem of 
externalities prevents the optimal amount of investment. In sum, the 
government looks to private businesses to provide a significant 
amount of national security. Approximately eighty-five percent of 
America’s CI is owned by the private sector.82 Despite the necessity 
of protecting CI, the government generally does not impose 
mandatory cybersecurity requirements or provide financial support 
for cybersecurity investment.83 
 Cyber-security can be understood in these terms. If a company 
suffers an intrusion, much of the harm will fall on third parties; the 
attack results in a negative externality. It can be extraordinarily 
difficult to internalize these costs. The class of persons affected by 
the intrusion will often be so large that it would be prohibitively 
expensive to use market exchanges to internalize the resulting 
externalities; the transaction costs are simply too great. Nor can tort 
law internalize the costs, as firms generally do not face liability for 
harms that result from cyber-attacks on their systems or products. 
Because many companies do not bear these costs, they ignore them 
when deciding how much to spend on cyber-defense and therefore 
tend to underinvest relative to socially optimal levels. (This is true 
both of companies that produce computer products, such as 
software manufacturers, and companies that use them, such as ISPs 
and utility companies.) Cyber-security also involves positive 
externalities. A company that secures itself against intruders makes 
it harder for assailants to commandeer its systems to attack others. 
Investments in cyber-defense thus effectively subsidize other firms. 
Because the investing company doesn’t capture the full benefit of 
 
81 In short, many other parties (including unidentifiable parties), other than the owner, 
benefit from infrastructure (critical or not). 
 Whether we are talking about [museums], transportation systems, the 
electricity grid, ideas, environmental ecosystems, or Internet infrastructure, the 
bulk of the social benefits generated by these resources derives from their 
downstream uses. They create value downstream by serving a wide variety of 
end-users who rely on access to them. Yet social demand for the infrastructure 
itself is extremely difficult to measure. 
See Frischmann, supra note 60, at 958. 
82 Sales, supra note 12, at 1506. 
83 Id. 
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its expenditures, it has weaker incentives to secure its systems. And 
because other companies are able to free ride on the investing firm’s 
expenditures, they have weaker incentives to adopt defenses of their 
own.84 
To the extent private entities underinvest in cybersecurity for CI, 
negative externalities increase because the cost of a successful 
cyberattack will be borne by numerous unrelated third parties. 
Because the entity with weak cybersecurity will not bear all those 
costs, the amount of investment in cybersecurity will not incorporate 
the full, actual cost of potential harm. On the other hand, an optimal 
amount of investment in cybersecurity will lead to increased positive 
externalities because unrelated third parties will enjoy the benefits of 
safe CI systems. However, any entity that invests an adequate amount 
in cybersecurity will not be able to charge for the positive 
externalities it generates. 
II 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF AMERICA’S CYBERSECURITY LAWS 
So what is the state of America’s law regarding the protection of 
CI? One commentator described America’s system of cybersecurity 
laws as a patchwork of related laws, much of which is focused on data 
breaches and privacy.85 The United States does not have a unified, 
comprehensive approach to cybersecurity law and policy; the area is 
addressed through the jurisdiction of a variety of federal agencies, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Trade 
Commission.86 
 
84 Id. at 1520. 
85 Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incentive-Based 
System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 402 (2016). 
86 Scott J. Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity 
Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 221 (2016) [hereinafter Shackelford et al., 
“Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks]. One commentator observed (in response to a 
question about the state of U.S. cybersecurity law), 
 After pausing for far too long, I said, “We don’t really have any cybersecurity 
laws.” What we have, instead, is a patchwork of related laws, including breach 
notification and privacy statutes, that focus on penalizing companies for 
inadequate data security. But our legal system lacks a coordinated network of 
laws that are designed to promote cybersecurity and prevent data breaches from 
occurring in the first place. 
Kosseff, supra note 85, at 402. Kosseff added: 
 As discussed above, the United States does not have a cohesive cybersecurity 
legal framework. Instead, it has a patchwork of laws that address some aspects of 
CHUNG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018  11:53 AM 
2018] Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure 459 
A starting point for a brief review of U.S. cybersecurity law is the 
2014 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework).87 The goal of the 
 
data security. These laws fail to work together harmoniously, occasionally 
conflict, and do little to ensure the future security of data, networks, and systems. 
The current legal system largely is backward-looking, and provides companies 
and the public sector little guidance as to how to prevent future cybersecurity 
incidents. 
Id. at 406. Johnson shares this assessment: “Cyberspace is governed by a patchwork of 
state, federal, and international regulations. Our fragmented regulatory framework, 
characterized by industry-specific legislation, leaves significant gaps in the oversight of 
cyberspace.” Johnson, supra note 1, at 576. Other commentators note, 
 In the private sector, federal statutes relating to cybersecurity are typically 
industry-specific and create general standards. In addition, the majority of these 
cybersecurity statutes are directed at health care entities and financial institutions. 
Again, while statutes were recently passed to facilitate private-public cooperation 
in establishing cybersecurity standards across critical infrastructure industries, 
they do not establish a comprehensive regulatory framework. 
Daniel Garrie & Shane R. Reeves, An Unsatisfactory State of the Law: The Limited 
Options for a Corporation Dealing with Cyber Hostilities by State Actors, 37 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1827, 1839 (2016). 
87 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf [hereinafter NIST 
FRAMEWORK]. The NIST Framework was developed pursuant to President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13636. Id. at 3. The Executive Summary opens by noting, “The national 
and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of critical 
infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of 
critical infrastructure systems, placing the Nation’s security, economy, and public safety 
and health at risk.” Id. at 1. The origins of cybersecurity law may be traced back to the 
1986 U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which criminalized unauthorized access and 
damage to computers and networks. See Amanda N. Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: 
A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 732 (2015). 
Subsequent federal legislation addressing cybersecurity include “the E-Government Act of 
2002, the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act of 2002, the Federal Information 
Security Management Act of 2002, the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, and the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 
2014.” Johnson, supra note 1, at 577. However, “no single piece of federal legislation 
exists that addresses cybersecurity threats and issues.” Id. Another important piece of 
legislation was the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c 
(2012). It states that it is the policy of the United States is to ensure 
(1) that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical 
infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, geographically limited in effect, 
manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, human and government 
services, and national security of the United States; 
(2) that actions necessary to achieve the policy stated in paragraph (1) be carried 
out in a public-private partnership involving corporate and non-governmental 
organizations; and 
(3) to have in place a comprehensive and effective program to ensure the 
continuity of essential Federal Government functions under all circumstances. 
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NIST Framework is to guide “the development of a voluntary risk-
based Cybersecurity Framework—a set of industry standards and best 
practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks.”88 Focus 
should be placed on “voluntary.”89 One goal of the NIST Framework 
is to promote the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in 
the United States by incorporating private industry best practices.90 It 
seeks to encourage “a flexible and cost-effective approach to 
enhancing cybersecurity by assisting owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure in assessing and managing cyber risk.”91 Freedom and 
flexibility are the bases of the NIST Framework. It does not establish 
or prescribe the amount of cyber-risk the private sector should tolerate 
in a given segment of their operations. Instead of developing an 
entirely new set of standards, it “‘relies on a variety of existing 
standards, guidelines, and practices to enable critical infrastructure 
providers to achieve resilience,’ which allows the Framework to 
‘scale across borders, acknowledge the global nature of cybersecurity 
risks, and evolve with technological advances and business 
requirements.’”92 The NIST Framework pursues the much more 
modest goal of providing a “common language” for entities to 
evaluate their current cybersecurity needs and vulnerabilities, 
determining the likelihood of attacks, and prioritizing opportunities 
for internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity risk.93 
At first glance, it may seem strange that such a vital aspect of 
national security should be left to voluntary efforts by the private 
sector. An alternative approach would have the federal government 
set mandatory standards and requirements for the establishment and 
implementation of cybersecurity protection of CI. However, there are 
strong policy reasons that support a voluntary approach, and strong 
arguments against mandatory federal requirements. First, the foremost 
experts and leaders of innovation usually work in the private sector, 
and technological advances often originate in the private sector. The 
 
Id. § 5195c(c). 
88 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1. 
89 See Shackelford et al., “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, supra note 86, at 
218 (describing America’s protection of CI as “a largely voluntary approach through the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology supplemented by sector-specific regulation 
and U.S. Cyber Command”). 
90 See id. at 221. 
91 Id. at 222. 
92 Id. at 223. 
93 Id. 
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leaders of the private sector, as a group, have superior expertise and 
knowledge to that of government officials. 
Second, technology develops and improves at a rapid pace, so it is 
likely that any set of mandatory regulations would be obsolete by the 
time they become effective. The private owners of CI could find 
themselves being forced to comply with outdated technology 
standards when state of the art technology is available.94 Basing CI 
protection on a voluntary approach preserves the private sector’s 
freedom to improve as rapidly as the technology advances and avoids 
problems created by inflexible or outdated regulatory requirements.95 
With such policy considerations in mind, the NIST Framework 
avoided imposing mandates on the private sector. Its Executive 
Summary states, 
 
94 A student note described the problem in this way: 
However, the private sector is generally wary of additional cybersecurity laws or 
regulations that might mandate specific standards or technology. The private 
sector puts forth four main arguments against regulations and broadly-scoped 
legislation. First, such requirements could increase business expenses and 
overhead as well as misallocate company resources. Second, companies would 
be forced to focus on compliance with measures that quickly become out-of-date 
and ineffective, rather than on methods to address current and future threats. 
Third, such requirements would disincentivize the public-private partnerships 
that are already addressing the challenges. Fourth, the regulations would not 
necessarily improve cybersecurity, particularly when the government does not 
have a great track record for protecting against cyber breaches. 
Chris Laughlin, Note, Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: A Proactive 
Approach to Ensure Inevitable Laws and Regulations are Effective, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 
345, 357 (2016). Other commentators have noted that imposing mandatory requirements 
on private entities regarding cybersecurity defenses would be counterproductive because 
of the possibility that the government standards would be below the level of security 
already implemented by private business. See Garrie & Reeves, supra note 86, at 1839 
n.62. 
95 See Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 309. The ability to 
respond rapidly to cyberthreats is crucial. CI owners suffer repeated cyberattacks, and 
some electric utilities report being probed thousands of times each month. See Shackelford 
et al., Sustainable Cybersecurity, supra note 14, at 2005–06. 
 Cybersecurity is in many ways an arms race between attackers and defenders. 
ICT systems are very complex, and attackers are constantly probing for 
weaknesses, which can occur at many points. Defenders can often protect against 
weaknesses, but three are particularly challenging: inadvertent or intentional acts 
by insiders with an access to a system; supply chain vulnerabilities, which can 
permit the insertion of malicious software or hardware during the acquisition 
processes and previously unknown, or zero-day, vulnerabilities with no 
established fix. Even for vulnerabilities where remedies are known, they may not 
be implemented in many cases because of budgetary or operational constraints. 
FISCHER, supra note 2, at 2. 
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 The Framework enables organizations–regardless of size, degree 
of cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication–to apply the 
principles and best practices of risk management to improving the 
security and resilience of critical infrastructure . . . . 
 The Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing 
cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will 
continue to have unique risks–different threats, different 
vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances–and how they implement 
the practices in the Framework will vary. Organizations can 
determine activities that are important to critical service delivery 
and can prioritize investments to maximize the impact of each 
dollar spent. Ultimately, the Framework is aimed at reducing and 
better managing cybersecurity risks.96 
By design, the NIST Framework provides a voluntary procedure for 
private-sector entities to determine and implement cybersecurity best 
practices without imposing regulatory requirements.97 
This voluntary approach to protection of CI is embodied in recent 
federal legislation addressing cybersecurity. The Cybersecurity Act of 
2015 became law on December 18, 2015.98 It establishes a voluntary 
information-sharing framework designed to encourage the private and 
public sectors to share cyberthreat information.99 The Act instructs 
the federal government “to establish procedures for sharing classified 
and unclassified cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures with 
the private sector.”100 The Department of Homeland Security is 
responsible for creating a mechanism for the government to receive 
notifications of cyberthreat indicators and defensive measures from 
the private sector and then sharing that information with other 
government entities.101 The emphasis on public-private sector 
cooperation makes sense and is necessary given the public-private 
nature of the Internet itself. The open architecture of the Internet 
makes it pointless to try to isolate or draw clear lines between private 
sector concerns and public sector concerns.102 
Title I of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 contains the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA).103 The purpose of CISA is 
 
96 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1–2. 
97 See Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 308–09. 
98 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015). 
99 See Kelly Russo & Harvey Rishikof, Cybersecurity: Executive Orders, Legislation, 
Cyberattacks, and Hot Topics, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 421, 433 (2016). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Kosseff, supra note 85, at 404. 
103 6 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) (“This title [enacting this subchapter . . .] may be cited as 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.”). The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
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to improve cybersecurity defenses in the United States by creating “a 
voluntary cybersecurity information sharing exchange designed to 
encourage public and private-sector actors to share cyber threat 
information.”104 CISA is designed to facilitate and promote “the 
timely sharing of . . . cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 
in the possession of the Federal Government with . . . non-Federal 
entities.”105 CISA makes clear, however, that private-sector 
involvement is voluntary.106 It provides, “Nothing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to permit a Federal entity . . . to require a non-
Federal entity to provide information to a Federal entity or another 
non-Federal entity . . . .”107 It further provides, “Nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to subject any entity to liability for 
choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized in this 
subchapter.”108 The text expressly and repeatedly emphasizes the 
voluntary nature of the legislation. 
 
contains four titles. Title I addresses the private sector and establishes a centralized 
mechanism for information sharing. Title II instructs DHS to improve cybersecurity within 
the federal government and to implement Title I. Title III calls for a cybersecurity 
assessment of the federal workforce. Title IV provides for other measures related to threats 
to critical information systems and networks. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
113, 129 Stat. 2242. 
104 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 578. 
 “Information sharing is one of the most potent tools we have to counter 
malicious cyber activity,” Julia Philipp, deputy director for cyber intelligence and 
head of the financial sector Cyber Intelligence Group at the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, said at a recent conference. “Malicious cyber actors share 
information and tools used to exploit our systems every day; we should be doing 
the same to stop them.” 
See Sean McMahon, Four Keys to Winning the Cyber Arms Race, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/vault/blog/four-keys-to-winning-the-cyber-arms-race/. 
105 6 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(1) (2012). A “non-Federal entity” includes “any private entity.” 
Id. § 1501(14)(A). A private entity “means any person or private group, organization, 
proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or 
nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.” Id. § 1501(15)(A). 
106 “It is important to note that CISA is strictly voluntary, i.e., there is no duty to share. 
It expressly prohibits the federal government from coercing parties into sharing. It also 
provides a safe harbor for participating entities, when they share information according to 
CISA’s provisions. . . .” Jasper L. Tran, Navigating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 19 
CHAP. L. REV. 483, 486 (2016). 
107 6 U.S.C. § 1507(h)(1). 
108 Id. § 1507(i). 
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III 
THE ADVANTAGES TO A VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO PROTECTION OF 
CI 
There are millions of connections to the Internet, through a wide 
range of devices. The parties connected to the Internet include private 
individuals, small businesses, large businesses, and governments. The 
parties that make Internet-connected products are similarly diverse. 
Given this wide range, it seems prudent to avoid seeking a strict 
regulatory regime to govern all users, providers, and beneficiaries of 
CI connected to the Internet. There are clearly dangers of regulatory 
overreach when trying to fashion a coherent set of rules to apply to 
such a wide range, and conventional regulatory schemes may be 
ineffective. The nature of the Internet and cyberspace poses unique 
challenges. 
 Cyberspace, by its very architecture, is a network of both 
private-sector and public-sector infrastructure. Unlike traditional 
regulatory area, such as food safety, where the government is more 
than an overseer of the private sector, the government is a partner 
with the private sector. The government developed the initial 
infrastructure of the Internet, and the private sector invested billions 
of dollars to build that initial infrastructure into the transformative 
force that it is today. Accordingly, unlike other areas, in which 
traditional top-down regulation is effective, cybersecurity requires a 
different mindset. Cybersecurity requires a continuation of the 
partnership between the government and companies. Indeed, an 
insecure Internet harms the private sector by slowing the growth 
and progress of the Internet; it is in the best interests of every 
company to work with the government for a more secure 
cyberspace.109 
Thus, the nature of the public-private relationship is actually like a 
partnership:110 partners need to work together, and one partner does 
not have the authority to command another partner. 
One commentator has advanced several arguments against a 
mandatory regulatory regime, such as (1) cyberattacks do not pose an 
existential threat, (2) there are means other than regulation (such as 
subsidies and liability risks) to address cybersecurity, (3) regulations 
cannot keep up with the pace of technological advances, (4) no 
federal agency is suitable for leading a regulatory response, (5) 
 
109 Kosseff, supra note 85, at 411–12. 
110 The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 actually uses the word 
“partnership” to describe the public-private relationship regarding cybersecurity. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5195c(c)(2) (2012). 
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lawmakers do not understand the nature of cybersecurity threats, (6) 
there are regulations already in place, and (7) American regulation 
will disrupt the global nature of the Internet.111 These points raise a 
variety of issues, many of which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, they present colorable arguments in favor of a “voluntary” 
approach. 
One point, in particular, is the inability to compare the cost versus 
benefit of increased cybersecurity. If the government is unable to 
calculate the benefit, it makes it difficult to justify requiring private 
entities to invest in a mandatory level of cybersecurity. Even a strong 
proponent of regulation, Professor Jack Goldsmith at Harvard, 
concedes that it is not possible to measure the cost of cybersecurity 
regulation versus the benefits.112 Another scholar agrees that the 
benefits of cybersecurity and risks of cyberattacks are “impossible to 
 
111 See Paul Rosenzweig, The Unpersuasiveness of the Case for Cybersecurity 
Regulation–An Introduction, LAWFARE BLOG (May 17, 2012, 12:35 PM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/unpersuasiveness-case-cybersecurity-regulation-%E2%80%93-introduc 
tion. In his opposition to regulation, Mr. Rosenzweig argues: (1) More regulation is not 
necessary because cyber vulnerabilities of CI are not an existential threat; (2) Regulation is 
not the only way that governments deal with externalities. They can also be addressed 
through other means like subsidies, taxes, and the imposition of liability; (3) Regulation is 
an especially poor choice for use in a dynamic and changing environment where existing 
performance standards will almost certainly be irrelevant within a few years; (4) No 
Federal agency is suitable or designed to lead a comprehensive regulatory effort; (5) 
Regulations already exist in this sphere and have not been particularly effective; and (6) 
Additional federal regulation may have significant adverse effects on Internet governance, 
along with adverse cross-border effects. Id. These views are one side of the coin, and there 
are equally compelling counterarguments. For example, it seems surprising that anyone 
would doubt the existential threat posed by attacks on cyber vulnerabilities. President 
Obama did not seem to have such doubts. 
Much of our critical infrastructure—our financial systems, our power grid, health 
systems—run on networks connected to the Internet, which is hugely 
empowering but also dangerous, and creates new points of vulnerability that we 
didn’t have before. Foreign governments and criminals are probing these systems 
every single day. We only have to think of real-life examples—an air traffic 
control system going down and disrupting flights, or blackouts that plunge cities 
into darkness—to imagine what a set of systematic cyber attacks might do. So 
this is also a matter of public safety. 
Obama, supra note 62. 
112 Jack Goldsmith, Response to Paul on Cyber-Regulation for Critical Infrastructure, 
LAWFARE BLOG (May 21, 2012, 12:11 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/response-paul 
-cyber-regulation-critical-infrastructure (“in truth I do not know how to assess the costs of 
regulation versus the costs of non-regulation, and I have not seen any good analysis of that 
crucial issue in this context. Nor do I think such an analysis will be forthcoming, because 
so much information is classified, and because metrics are very hard in this context.”). 
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measure precisely.”113 If this is indeed the case, then cybersecurity 
presents a highly challenging area to regulate because of the 
unknowability of benefits versus costs.114 Because of the uncertainty 
over the benefits, efficacy, and effect on technological progress, 
perhaps the prudent course is to start with a voluntary, bottom-up 
approach.115 There seem to be too many open questions regarding 
cost, benefit, and implementation for effective regulation. For 
example, the cost of a strong regulatory regime can partly be 
measured in dollar cost of things like upgrades, and compliance and 
legal fees. However, what is the corresponding dollar benefit? If the 
cost and benefit cannot be compared, how would a government justify 
a strong regulatory response?116 The problem is aggravated if the cost 
 
113 Lawrence A. Gordon, Univ. of Md., Speaker at the International NCSC ONE 
Conference 2015: Investing in Cybersecurity: Insights from the Gordon-Loeb Model 4 
(Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/SignatureEvents_Confer 
ences_Symposiums_EventsNotSpecificToACenter/IBMWorkshop/2015/gordon.pdf. 
114 A cost-benefit analysis is a fundamental principle of administrative rulemaking. 
 Cost-benefit analysis has . . . been elevated to the top of the administrative 
agenda by presidential orders that have tried to make comparison of costs and 
benefits a central element of federal regulation. On February 17, 1981, President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291. It provides detailed procedures for 
issuance of so-called major regulations by executive branch regulatory agencies. 
All such agencies are required to prepare regulatory-impact analyses when they 
promulgate major rules. They must analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed 
regulations, and they are required to “maximize the net benefits to society.” If the 
least-cost alternative has not been selected, the agencies are required to explain 
why. 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 178 (3d ed. 1991). Thus, agencies are 
required to prepare a report on the costs and benefits of proposed regulations pursuant to 
presidential Executive Orders, and this is a generally accepted part of the administrative 
process. See PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 86, 87, 434. However, only a few 
statutes expressly require an agency to prove that the benefits of a regulation exceed the 
costs. Id. at 437. Moreover, Congress has frequently rejected the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in many areas of heavily-regulated law. Id. at 435. 
115 The problem with a top-down approach was described this way: 
 Too often government regulates through rigid commands, precluding industries 
from using more flexible and cost-effective measures that achieve the same 
goals. For example, in air and water pollution control, the rigid “best available 
technology” approach, which mandates control technologies for hundreds or 
even thousands of firms, gives industries little incentive to improve existing 
pollution control technologies. Incentive-based systems could save billions of 
dollars. Yet in spite of the potential advantages, efforts to seek better regulatory 
tools are hobbled by the statutory status quo, which either forbids such tools or 
engrafts them onto a bureaucratically complex system. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 247, 260 (1996). 
116 There is, of course, the case against over-reliance on cost-benefit analysis. 
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of strong regulation acts as an impediment to technological advances. 
In that situation, the costs could dangerously outweigh the benefits.117 
There is also uncertainty regarding both the extent and likelihood of 
harm. A cost-benefit analysis would need to factor in whether CI 
vulnerabilities pose an existential threat to systems, social order, and 
lives. If so, what is the likelihood of such a successful attack? Or is 
any attack on CI manageable, even if the likelihood of success is 
higher? These are necessary issues that need to be addressed when 
considering the type, extent, and strength of regulatory requirements. 
At a minimum, a basic expected value analysis would be one of the 
first steps. This type of analysis determines the likelihood of a 
particular threat and then multiplies that by the amount of estimated 
harm. However, if it is impracticable to supply reliable numbers into 
this calculation, then any result is unhelpful. It would be imprudent to 
impose regulatory mandates based on indeterminable data. 
Governments around the world confront the same issues regarding 
cybersecurity, and many have arrived at the same conclusion as the 
United States in not adopting top-down, command regulatory 
regimes.118 
 
Supporters of regulation counter that benefits do exceed costs for health and 
safety and environmental regulation, that a cost-benefit standard is an 
inappropriate measure of whether there should be regulation because it is 
extremely uncertain and biased, and that many forms of regulation have equitable 
goals which cannot be measured in economic terms. 
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 16. 
117 The danger of unintended effects is an inherent risk in any regulatory scheme. 
 Many regulatory initiatives result in harmful unintended consequences. Under 
the existing regulatory system, there is no systematic way to ensure that those 
consequences receive attention. Hence regulation tends to be based on partial 
perspectives that emerge from close attention to mere pieces of complex 
problems. This myopic approach ignores the importance of ensuring that 
regulation does not have unexplored side-effects or increase harms or risks on 
balance. 
Sunstein, supra note 115, at 261–62. This passage neatly describes the problem regarding 
cybersecurity regulation. The need for a stronger legal framework may be driven by 
anecdotal accounts of well-publicized data breaches, as opposed to a systemic study of the 
problem. Indeed, it is frustrating that experts cannot even agree if cyberattacks pose 
existential threats. 
118 See Shackelford et al., “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, supra note 86, at 
218–19. 
 The Cybersecurity Framework takes a risk-based approach for organizations to 
detect, mitigate, and respond to cyber threats. Rather than developing new 
cybersecurity standards and risk management processes, the Cybersecurity 
Framework “relies on a variety of existing standards, guidelines, and practices to 
enable critical infrastructure providers to achieve resilience,” which allows the 
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Another advantage of a voluntary approach is that it provides 
flexibility and the ability to adapt rapidly to new threats. Cyberattacks 
and cybersecurity are not static concepts. The creation of new forms 
of threats are limited only by the imagination of the hackers. As soon 
as cybersecurity experts can thwart a particular type of threat, new 
threats will spring up to evade the newly developed defenses. This 
cycle of attack and response is like an infinite loop. It would be 
extremely difficult for a “hard” regulatory approach based on top-
down mandates by the federal government to adapt at the speed 
necessary to match the ongoing battle between hackers and 
cybersecurity defenses. 
Other incentives encourage the development of strong 
cybersecurity defenses. Lawsuits from highly publicized breaches 
provide one form of incentive. For example, Target paid $39 million 
to settle a class action lawsuit resulting from the cybersecurity breach 
of its customers’ personal information.119 Sony paid nearly $8 million 
to settle a lawsuit filed by employees whose personal information was 
stolen through a cyberattack.120 Thus, America’s tort system provides 
 
Framework to “scale across borders, acknowledge the global nature of 
cybersecurity risks, and evolve with technological advances and business 
requirements.” The Cybersecurity Framework provides a “common language” 
for entities to evaluate their current cybersecurity posture, determine their 
targeted state for cybersecurity, prioritize opportunities for improvement, assess 
progress toward their targeted state, and establish sufficient methods of 
communication among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity 
risk. 
Shackelford et al., Global Cybersecurity, supra note 55, at 329–30 (quoting NIST 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 1). 
 The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 obligated NIST to coordinate 
with industry leaders and critical infrastructure owners to facilitate and support 
the development of an industry-led set of standards and procedures to reduce 
cyber risks to critical infrastructure. Part of the Act requires NIST to consult with 
government agencies in an attempt to coordinate the cybersecurity efforts 
between public and private sectors. The Act further requires NIST to work with 
industry leaders to “identify a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-
based, and cost-effective” set of standards that “owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure” can adopt to help “identify, assess, and manage cyber risks.” 
Garrie & Reeves, supra note 86, at 1845 (quoting Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 272(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2012)). 
119 Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million over Data Breach, CNNMONEY (Dec. 
2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/companies/target-data-breach  
-settlement/. 
120 Nate Raymond, Sony Settles Employees’ Suit Over ‘The Interview’ Data Breach for 
$8 Million, INS. J. (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015 
/10/21/385672.htm. This breach arose in connection with Sony’s release of the movie, The 
Interview, which was a comedy set in North Korea. Id. 
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a layer of incentive to bolster cybersecurity. There are problems, 
however, with relying on tort law. First, if damages are at issue, it 
means the harm has already occurred. Tort law may compensate 
victims after harm has occurred, but it may not sufficiently 
incentivize the development of preventative measures. Second, tort 
law does not solve the problem of negative externalities. If an electric 
utility has weak cyberdefenses and is breached, not all persons 
affected by the power loss will be able to prove proximate causation. 
Thus, the utility will not bear all the loss caused by its inadequate 
cyberdefenses. Finally, the country may not want to rely on the tort 
system to prevent catastrophic attacks. 
Thus, the question remains whether current law results in adequate 
cybersecurity. Given the numerous issues involved, a voluntary 
approach may be the most prudent, least disruptive course to take. 
However, there are obvious problems with this approach. 
IV 
THE DISADVANTAGES TO A VOLUNTARY APPROACH TO PROTECTION 
OF CI 
Widely accepted economic theory tells us that the free market will 
result in an undersupply of public goods. There are two reasons for 
the significant underinvestment in cybersecurity protection of CI. 
Because private businesses are profit driven, they will produce only 
those goods from which they can earn a profit. As a result, they will 
not produce public goods because public goods are nonexcludable.121 
In other words, the positive externalities enjoyed by third parties 
generated by investment in cybersecurity cannot be captured as profit 
by the provider of the cybersecurity. A supplier of a public good (like 
cybersecurity of CI) cannot exclude free riders or force them to 
pay.122 A free market is unable to provide a profit incentive for the 
production or supply of public goods. The other side of this coin is 
that entities that own CI do not bear the full cost of an 
underinvestment in cybersecurity because much of the cost will be 
borne by unrelated third parties. Even self-interest in self-protection 
does not provide adequate economic incentives in the case of 
protection of CI. An electric utility may calculate that in the event of a 
cyberattack that destroys power generation equipment, it will incur a 
certain cost to repair the damage. However, the cost of repair does not 
 
121 See Public Goods Podcast, supra note 64. 
122 Id. 
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capture the external costs to all the customers who suffer from a 
power outage. For these reasons, there will likely be underinvestment 
in cybersecurity:123 
“Many companies that operate critical infrastructure tend to 
underinvest in cyber-defense because of negative externalities, 
positive externalities, free riding, and public goods problems—the 
same sorts of challenges the modern administrative state encounters 
in a variety of other contexts.”124 
The market, by itself, is unable to provide sufficient incentives for 
an optimal amount of spending on cybersecurity. A report by a 
leading consulting firm seems to confirm this conclusion. According 
to the report, global cybersecurity spending was expected to reach an 
all-time high of $76.9 billion in 2015.125 However, the majority of IT 
executives anticipated receiving only half of the funding necessary to 
execute their preferred security strategies.126 The report highlighted 
the problem of this underfunding. It went on to state that U.S. 
businesses encounter approximately 1.7 successful cyberattacks per 
week and incur annual costs of $12.7 million per business to address 
the impacts.127 The frequency, complexity, and costs associated with 
 
123 Sales observes, 
 If this analysis is correct, then strategically significant firms in uncompetitive 
markets are less likely to adequately invest in cyber-security than ordinary firms 
in competitive markets. The question then becomes who should be responsible 
for securing these most sensitive companies against the most dangerous 
adversaries. Economists often argue that risk should be allocated to the low cost 
avoider. If the government can reduce a vulnerability more efficiently than a 
firm, it should pay; if the firm can reduce a vulnerability more efficiently, it 
should pay. But there is no single low cost avoider in this context. Defending 
critical infrastructure against sophisticated cyber-attackers is a task that features 
dueling comparative advantages. Private firms typically know more than 
outsiders, including the government, about the architecture of their systems, so 
they often are in a better position to know about weaknesses that intruders might 
exploit. The private sector thus has a comparative advantage at identifying cyber-
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the government’s highly skilled intelligence 
agencies typically know more than the private sector about malware used by 
foreign governments and about how to defeat it. The government thus has a 
comparative advantage at detecting sophisticated attacks and developing 
countermeasures. This suggests that responsibility for defending the most 
sensitive systems against the most sophisticated adversaries should be shared. 
Sales, supra note 12, at 1517–18. 
124 Id. at 1507. 
125 BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER ROI: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO QUANTIFYING 
THE FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF CYBERSECURITY 1 (2015). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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attacks are increasing, but the report concludes that many 
organizations are reluctant to increase cybersecurity spending because 
they are unable to accurately quantify the financial value of 
prospective investments.128 
The problem is compounded by the vulnerabilities of smaller 
companies that are linked to a larger company. Returning to the 
example of the Boeing 777 from this Article’s introduction, even if it 
is assumed that Boeing correctly assessed the risk to its systems and 
invested the right amount in cybersecurity defense, the same may not 
be true for the hundreds of suppliers who supply the parts that go into 
the aircraft. For example, suppose a small company provides parts for 
the in-flight entertainment system and assume that the parts are 
accessible to the Internet. Does that small supplier have sufficient 
incentive to invest properly in cybersecurity when the monetary 
damage to it of a cyberattack on its parts is tiny compared to the 
possible harm that may occur if the safety of the aircraft is breached 
by an attack through the in-flight entertainment system? Does a small 
supplier have the money to invest in increased cybersecurity? Boeing 
may have a large budget to devote to it, but what about the hundreds 
of smaller companies in the supply chain? 129 
The financial costs faced by small vendors to larger businesses is 
exemplified by the challenges that threaten law firms. Law firms are 
part of CI systems because they are linked to clients who operate CI. 
The owners and operators of CI systems are vulnerable to threats and 
breaches initiated through attacks on their law firms.130 The 
 
128 Id. 
129 See Shackelford & Russell, Above the Cloud, supra note 47, at 641 (discussing this 
hypothetical threat). 
The proverbial “weak link” in the chain of CI could result in catastrophic 
economic damage, which is compounded by the sheer number of access points 
that cyber attackers may exploit. Government contractors, private-sector actors, 
public-sector organizations, utilities companies, and so on, all have separate 
regulators, differing cybersecurity standards, and long supply chains. 
Id. The use of everyday, seemingly innocuous devices to cripple the Internet has already 
happened. In October 2016, there was a massive distributed denial of service attack that 
shut down major websites. Hackers used hundreds of thousands of web-connected devices 
such as webcams and DVRs to launch the cyberattack. See Sam Thielman & Elle Hunt, 
Cyber Attack: Hackers ‘Weaponised’ Everyday Devices with Malware, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
22, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/22/cyber-attack    
-hackers-weaponised-everyday-devices-with-malware-to-mount-assault. 
130 See Julie Sobowale, Large or Small, Law Firms are Learning They Must Deal with 
Cybersecurity, 103 A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2017). Law firms have suffered theft of money from 
their bank accounts, theft of confidential client information for use in illegal trading, and 
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vulnerabilities are widely acknowledged, but the response has been 
slow due to the high financial cost of improving cybersecurity 
defenses.131 The simple but necessary step of upgrading software 
poses a financial problem for many firms, and this cost generally 
cannot be passed on to clients.132 Law firms are a typical provider or 
supplier to the larger businesses that own CI systems, and there is no 
reason to think that the financial problems for law firms are unique to 
them. Thus, studies in these areas produce expected findings. 
The studies found that many firms regard cyber-security as little 
more than “a last box they have to check,” and that they neglect 
network security because they find it too expensive. In particular, 
McAfee [a provider of cybersecurity software] found that 
companies often have weak authentication requirements–tools that 
can verify that the person who is accessing a system is who he says 
he is, and is authorized to access the system. Even fewer have 
systems that can monitor network activity and identify anomalies. 
Other studies reveal that some companies’ defenses are so poor they 
don’t even know when they’ve suffered an attack.133 
Cybersecurity for CI relies on financial investments by private 
parties in their systems. Even assuming that all private parties 
understand the importance of cybersecurity, they may not have the 
money to spend on it.134 
V 
A MODEST PROPOSAL TO BOLSTER CYBERSECURITY DEFENSES 
The traditional approach to increasing public goods such as 
cybersecurity is well known. The government can play its traditional 
role as the provider or facilitator.135 The government has a unique 
role because it does not face the same problems as private businesses 
that need a profit incentive.136 The government has taken the first 
 
disclosure of confidential documents in the notorious Panama Papers incident, all through 
cyberattacks. Id. at 40–41. 
131 Id. at 36. 
132 Id. 
133 Sales, supra note 12, at 1512. 
134 See Tran, supra note 106, at 483, 486. 
135 “So how do we get public goods? The government steps in. Unlike a private firm, 
the government has no profit motive. And the government reduces the free rider problem 
by collecting taxes from consumers to help fund public goods.” Public Goods Podcast, 
supra note 64. 
136 Frischmann’s article states, 
In other words, it is generally accepted that the market will fail in one way or 
another to efficiently provide society with infrastructure and that there is some 
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steps of creating a voluntary framework. However, there is more that 
can be done. To this end, this Article proposes a modest, incremental 
expansion of the government’s role that builds on the voluntary 
framework. The continued interaction between the private and public 
sectors remains crucial because each has its own areas of advantages 
the other side lacks. 
A significant barrier to improvement in cybersecurity is the cost, 
and cost is likely to be a more challenging issue for smaller firms.137 
To address this problem, the federal government could subsidize, in 
whole or part, upgrades to cybersecurity defenses.138 Government 
subsidization is a traditional response to encourage the production of 
public goods.139 The appeal of subsidies in this particular area is that 
the federal government already subsidizes protection of CI. The 
proposal is to simply expand subsidies already authorized by 
Congress to include more private entities. 
Federal legislation to encourage private-sector protection of CI 
systems is already in place. For example, Title 10 of the United States 
Code includes the following provision: 
 
role for government intervention . . . . The question then becomes one of 
comparative institutional analysis: how should the government modify or 
regulate the market? 
Frischmann, supra note 60, at 940. He adds, “[c]ritically, many infrastructure resources act 
as inputs into a wide variance of socially valuable activities, including the production of 
public goods and nonmarket goods. These activities generate significant social welfare 
gains that are generally associated with traditional infrastructure, yet underappreciated 
with respect to nontraditional infrastructure.” Id. at 932. 
137 See Robert Gyenes, Note, A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework is Unworkable—
Government Must Crack the Whip, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 293, 295 (2014) 
(claiming that voluntary policy “creates a financial burden on the target ‘critical’ 
infrastructure without providing a solution”). “In part because the government doesn’t 
provide any funding, businesses have decided not to invest in new secure facilities and 
network upgrades to handle classified data.” Id. at 305. “Under the current Framework, 
companies are left to wonder how they will finance any voluntary cyber improvements 
without incentives. Corporations failing to invest in cybersecurity often cite budget 
constraints as ‘the number one challenge to contributing to the [cybersecurity] levels the 
business expects.’” Id. at 311. 
138 See Goldsmith, supra note 112 (explaining that subsidies may be considered as one 
of many forms of government regulation). 
 Regulation can serve the public interest in two ways. First, it can address 
“market failure” or the absence of one or more of the factors necessary for an 
efficient market. A private market is “efficient” when it produces only those 
goods and services most desired by consumers. Second, regulation is justified on 
the ground that the outcome of markets is inconsistent with important collective 
social values other than economic efficiency. 
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., supra note 75, at 13–14. 
139 See Sales, supra note 12, at 1519. 
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In order to meet the national security objectives in section 2501(a) 
of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a program 
under which the Secretary may issue guarantees assuring lenders 
against losses of principal or interest, or both principal and interest, 
for loans made to qualified commercial firms to fund, in whole or in 
part, any of the following activities: 
(1)  The improvement of the protection of the critical infrastructure 
of the commercial firms. 
(2)  The refinancing of improvements previously made to the 
protection of critical infrastructure of the commercial firms.140 
The necessity for this statute was spurred by national defense 
issues, and this Article referenced the DOD’s interim final rule 
requiring contractors to meet certain NIST standards. In responding to 
that rule, the Small Business Administration (SBA) raised the issue of 
the financial burdens faced by small businesses in upgrading 
cybersecurity. To ease the burden, the SBA recommended “that DOD 
consider alternatives, such as collaborating with universities or other 
organizations to provide low-cost cybersecurity services to small 
businesses, or providing a one-time subsidy to small businesses to 
help cover the cost of initial consultations with third-party 
vendors.”141 
This Article proposes the expansion of subsidies beyond matters 
under the jurisdiction of the DOD so that other CI systems receive 
government support. The fact that Congress and the DOD already 
have a subsidy program in place for CI should be viewed as strong 
support for the case in favor of subsidies and is a clear indication that 
Congress recognizes the need for such financial support for the 
private sector. A main problem seems to be that such programs are 
not available for all CI systems. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s proposal depends on federal budget issues and 
political will.142 However, if the country is to maintain a voluntary 
 
140 10 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2012). 
141 See SBA, Opinion Letter on Interim Rule, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for Cloud Services (Feb. 29, 
2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/DFARS_security_interim_comment_letter 
.pdf. 
142 This Article focuses on economic problems in the form of market failure as 
obstacles to optimal protection of CI. However, a more complete discussion requires 
acknowledgement of the political obstacles as well. Some powerful businesses in the 
private sector oppose government efforts to strengthen cybersecurity defenses and spend 
millions of dollars in lobbying efforts to resist such efforts. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra 
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approach to cybersecurity, it seems any improved approach will 
necessarily include expanded subsidization to assist the private sector. 
The government’s existing legislation acknowledges the merits of 
subsidies for CI. Because the use of subsidies to protect CI already 
has congressional approval in some instances, an increase in the role 
of subsidies deserves further consideration. In enacting the Critical 
Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, Congress found that “[p]rivate 
business, government, and the national security apparatus 
increasingly depend on an interdependent network of critical physical 
and information infrastructures, including telecommunications, 
energy, financial services, water, and transportation sectors.”143 In 
order to ensure full and optimal participation by the private sector, 
some sort of government support is necessary. Otherwise, the public 
good nature of cybersecurity of CI will continue to frustrate optimal 
protection. 
Government support is especially vital because the cybersecurity 
battle changes constantly. As soon as one threat is addressed, another 
replaces it. Defense requires constant monitoring and response, and 
the cost to the private sector is significant. Experts in the area know 
the nature of the problems. However, the problems are extremely 
difficult to quantify. How much is the right amount of spending on 
cybersecurity? What is the likelihood of any particular kind of attack, 
and what is the estimated amount of resulting damage? How does one 
go about determining numbers like this? Private businesses cannot 
afford to overspend on a low-risk problem, but they also expose 
themselves if they underspend on a high-risk problem. Additionally, 
 
note 37, at 137–43 (discussing Microsoft’s lobbying efforts). In addition to the influence 
of money on the political process, politicians themselves may also be obstacles. This is 
Clarke’s description of the situation: 
Congress is a federation of fiefdoms, subject to the vicissitudes of constant fund 
raising and the lobbying of those who have donated the funds. That situation has 
two adverse consequences with regard to congressional involvement in cyber war 
oversight. First, everyone wants his or her own fiefdom. Congress has resisted 
any suggestion, such as was made by Senator Bob Bennett (Republican of Utah), 
that there be one committee authorized to examine cyber security . . . . Second, 
Congress ‘eschews regulation’ and spits it out. The influential donors from the 
information technology, electric power, pipeline, and telecommunications 
industries have made the idea of serious cyber security regulations as remote as 
public financing of congressional campaigns or meaningful limits on campaign 
contributions. 
Id. at 263. Of course, this is one person’s personal opinion. Yet, it is an opinion that 
deserves consideration. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b)(2) (2012). 
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private businesses may not be positioned to be able to assess the risk 
or likelihood of an attack. A proposal for increased subsidization is a 
mild response to the nature of the problem. However, if there was a 
better solution, it would probably already be in place. At a minimum, 
the goal of this Article is to increase awareness of the problems and 
the threat potentials, as reliance on the Internet continues to grow. 
 
